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This article explores the constitutionality of President
Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War and poses the question
of whether Lincoln taking possession of the railroads and
telegraph companies during the Civil War was constitutional.
The answer to this was, Lincoln’s actions were, in fact,
constitutional because Congress expressly authorized his
actions. His taking possession of the railroads and telegraph
companies provided compensation to the companies affected.
Further, the article analyzes the constitutional and
congressional authority for allowing President Lincoln to take
possession and provide compensation. The article also
addresses the history of the Presidential “Commander-inChief” powers, prior to and contemporaneous to the Civil War.
The article also addresses the contemporaneous and
post effects of his using the executive action and its
technological, infrastructural, and practical effects upon the
Civil War. Finally, the article addresses the lasting effects from
President Lincoln’s expansion of the scope of executive power,
including both future presidents and case law.

INTRODUCTION
The Civil War was America’s greatest constitutional
crisis, but slavery was not the only constitutional issue to arise
during the war. During the Civil War, many legal issues arose
including alleged violations of habeas corpus, First Amendment
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rights violations, and slavery’s eventual prohibition. One of the
lesser-known constitutional issues implicated in the Civil War
was the government’s taking of private property from Union
citizens.
Before Lincoln, a president had to have congressional
authorization to perform most actions, including taking private
property. When President Lincoln took possession of the
private railroads and telegraphs for military use during the
Civil War, his actions were constitutional, and they
subsequently provided the basis for the expansion of executive
power. President Lincoln’s expansion of the executive power
also had contemporaneous and subsequent effects on relevant
case law and executive action.

I. BOTH THE CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL LAW AUTHORIZE
GOVERNMENTAL TAKINGS.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The U.S. Constitution expressly grants Congress the
power to declare war on behalf of the country.1 When Congress
declares war, the President “shall be the Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States…when called into
the actual Service of the United States.” 2 Furthermore, the
President is charged with the duty of ensuring that Congress’s
laws are faithfully executed.3
This constitutional grouping of duties means that the
federal government contributes to war by allowing the
President of the U.S. to wage war while Congress merely
“shirks its constitutional responsibility” and the judiciary has a
“laissez-faire” approach.4 After Congress has deemed that war
is necessary, Congress grants the needed appropriations and
vests power to the President to perform his “Commander-inChief” duties, to neutralize the current threat by winning the
declared war, and to hand his wartime powers back to
Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
3 U.S. CONST . art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
4 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 171 (1996).
1
2
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This process of transferring war powers between
branches is supported by the Framer’s conscious fear of a
concentration of power in one particular branch. The Framers
were worried that creating and maintaining a standing army
would lead to concentrated power within the executive branch
by causing “tyranny at home”. This would be similar to
European countries keeping standing armies “ under the
pretext of defending, [but instead, enslaving] the people” by
allocating the country’s physical power to one branch.5
Although the topic will be fully discussed later, when
analyzing a president’s actions, part of the analysis includes
assessing the Executive Branch’s current scope of power based
on its evolution.6 Congress gave Presidents “wartime powers”
discretion in dealing with conflicts until Lincoln’s
administration. However, Congress closely supervised and
scrutinized the President’s actions during war or conflict, even
when Lincoln was acting with regard to statutorily-authorized
confiscations of private property.7 Hence, the sitting presidents
who came before Lincoln would rarely act under color of title
without first obtaining express congressional approval in
defining the scope in which he may act under the specified
circumstances.8

B. LINCOLN’S ACTIONS WERE WELL INSIDE HISTORICAL
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS.
1. CONGRESS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED PRESIDENT
LINCOLN TO CONTROL THE RAILROAD AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANIES.
On January 31, 1862, Congress expressly approved
President Lincoln’s power to “take possession of the Railroad

James Madison, Speech Before Constitutional Convention (June 29,
1787).
6 This comment is in regards to the constitutional context up to this
point in history, not the practical effects.
7 Brown v. U.S., 12 U.S. 110 (1814).
8 David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb- A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 957
(2008).
5

51

PRESIDENT LINCOLN

52

and Telegraph Lines” in the interests of “public safety.”9 In
doing so, this act authorized the President to take possession of
and hold any public or private railroads. It also allowed the
President to take possession of the companies’ stock, personnel
or real property, for the limited purpose of transportation of
troops, munitions, equipment, military property, and stores
anywhere throughout the United States.10
Furthermore, this Congressional Act authorized the
President to place any previously-stated personnel under
military control and make them subject to the rules and articles
of war.11 The Act provided for the companies’ punishment if
they were charged with resisting, interfering, or attempting to
destroy or injure the property that was subject to the act. Any
infractions “shall be” subject to a court-martial and any
punishment up to and including death.12
Congress also had the foresight to include within this
Act, the caveat, that the President shall appoint a commission
to “assess and determine the damages suffered, or the
compensation to which any railroad or telegraph company may
be entitled by reason of the railroad or telegraph line being
seized.” 13 Then, the amounts would be submitted to Congress
for payment to the companies or individuals. This procedure of
appointing a commissioner to compensate the companies or
individuals satisfies the constitutional requirement that the
federal government shall not take private property for public
use without just compensation.14
After the Act went into effect, the government bought
its own locomotives and train cars15 at fair market value from
private individuals, except for those locomotives and cars
constructed by the Union or captured from the Confederacy.16

Act of Dec. 2, 1861, ch. 15§ 1, 1861 App. to the Congressional Globe
334 (1861).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at § 2.
13 Id. at § 3.
14 U.S. CONST . AMEND . V; See, e.g. Omnia Commercial Co. v. U.S., 261
U.S. 502 (1923).
15 Hereafter “cars.”
16 DANIEL C. MCCALLUM , R EPORT OF BREVET BRIG. GENERAL D.C.
MCCALLUM, 1, 10 (1866).
9
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In 1861, P.W. & B. Railroad made a net profit increase of
over $1,000,000, an increase from 1860’s net profit of $236,000.
In 1863, the same company made net revenues of
$1,042,266.42.17 Actually, all recorded companies, except the
B&O Railroad, experienced increased business and profits
during the war years. The reasons behind this are the war
closed the Mississippi River’s waterway travel and poor crop
seasons in Europe increased overall railroad freight demands in
transporting crops to New York and ultimately to Europe via
boat.18 Therefore, the war actually helped the railroads
withdraw from their economic depressions, ensuring that 1863
became “one of the most prosperous [years] ever known to
American Railways.”19 Because of this increase in profits, the
railroad companies appeared to be war profiteering.20
The northern railroads were not technically “seized” in
the traditional constitutional meaning, but they were under
direct supervision of the U.S. Military Railroad’s21 General
McCallum. Furthermore, only a handful of instances existed
where the government actually seized a railroad.22
One such example is when foreign miners in
Pennsylvania, who were opposed to the draft, forced the
government to operate the Philadelphia and Reading Railroads
as to not disrupt coal deliveries for the U.S. Navy.23 More
specifically, the labor strike’s catalyst was related to a fifty-centper-day raise demand, and the Reading Railroad’s president,
Mr. Charles E. Smith, sent Assistant Secretary of War and
former Reading Railroad President to Washington, D.C. to fix
the effective labor strike.24 The result was that General
McCallum ordered the reassignment of 142 men from the
THOMAS WEBER, THE NORTHERN RAILROADS IN THE CIVIL WAR:
1861-1865 49-50 (1952).
18 Id.at 59-62.
19 Id. at 53 (quoting AMERICAN R AILROAD JOURNAL (1864).).
20 This article does not delve into the levels of governmental takings
and actual amounts of compensation to a private party.
21 Hereafter “U.S.M.R.R.”
22 Weber, supra note 17.
23 Id. at 119 (quoting FRANK H. TAYLOR, PHILADELPHIA IN THE CIVIL
WAR 47 (1913).). This situation is notably similar to the Steel Seizure
Case.
24 J.L. BLACKMAN, THE SEIZURE OF THE R EADING R AILROAD IN 1864 50
(1987).
17
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captured Alexandria Railway to Philadelphia for temporary
duty.25 However, Mr. Smith actually requested that
commanding Major General George Cadwalader take
immediate military possession of the railroad during the crisis,
to which the Major General agreed26
Even during the seizure of railroads near battle areas,
the War Department was “very careful to give each [railroad]
the ‘just compensation’ which the Constitution required,” but
the railroad waived monetary compensation because the
company benefited financially during the governmental
seizure.27 After the immediate need for coal (for both the U.S
Navy and U.S.M.R.R.) ended, the Assistant Quartermaster
General returned the railroad to the private company.28 The
War Department was effective in ensuring they committed no
constitutional violations. There were no other recorded
complaints or lawsuits in regards to Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause violations.
During the Civil War, President Lincoln interpreted his
own wartime power to include the “right to seize citizens’
property if such seizure should become indispensable to the
successful prosecution of the war.” 29 During Lincoln’s
administration, Congress debated whether to build its own
railroad system or work with private companies for military
transportation. Congress also considered building its own
railroad between Washington, D.C. and New York. However,
after much debate between lobbyists in New York and
Baltimore with Secretary of War Stanton, Congress scrapped
the governmental railroad idea. Congress further expressly
repealed any executive right vested in President Lincoln to
complete or extend any uncompleted railroad already in
construction.30

Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
27 Id. at 55-56.
28 Id. at 56 (quoting J.J. MOORE , R EPORT OF J.J. MOORE , OFFICIAL
RECORDS, WAR OF THE REBELLION, 67-8.).
29 JAMES G. R ANDALL , CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 6
(1926).
30 APPENDIX TO CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 37 TH CONG., 2 ND SESS ., 333,
423 (1861).
25
26
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The result in abandoning any governmental railroad
was that the government bought the ticket fares for its troops,
munitions, cavalry, and other items of war directly from the
private companies. As such, the government entered into
negotiated contracts with the different railroad companies for
fares. The railroads charged approximately two cents per mile
per soldier, allowing each soldier up to 80 pounds of baggage,
while “equipment, munitions, and troop supplies were to be
carried at first-class local rates,” the charge varying for weight
and distance.31
The North’s Reading Railroad transported the most out
of any other railroad for a total of 953,397 troops during the
Civil War, while the Illinois Central moved 556,421 troops
during the war.32 As previously noted, almost every operating
railroad at the time saw large profits during the Civil War;
however, the only railroad claiming losses during the Civil War
was the Michigan Central Railroad.33 The Michigan Central
Railroad claimed that the war had dislocated their business,
and they did not receive enough government patronage to
make up their losses, but there was never any actual recorded
“seizure” or governmental “taking” of this railroad to justify
compensation.34
In addition to compensating railroad companies for
transporting military personnel and assets, the government
compensated the northern railroad companies for the traffic on
their lines by the government’s own locomotives and cars.35
After the Union Army confiscated southern railroads, the
U.S.M.R.R. then repaired the railroads, including bridges, and
after the war, returned the property to the southern
companies.36 Of course, this holding of personal property and
its eventual outcome was dependent upon the Civil War’s
outcome.
Weber, supra note 17, at 151-52.
Id. at 262-63.
33 ANNUAL R EPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN
INDIANA RAILROAD , 26 (1864).
34 Id.
35 David Pfeiffer, Working Magic with Cornstalks and Beanpoles: Records
Relating to the U.S. Military Railroads During the Civil War, 43
PROLOGUE (June 1, 2011), at 32.
36 Id.
31
32

55

PRESIDENT LINCOLN

56

In regards to confiscated Confederate property, case
law at the time provided that it was “usually held as a mere
military occupation until the fate of the nation from which it is
conquered is determined; but if the [Confederacy] is entirely
subdued, or … be destroyed and ceases to exist, the right of
occupation becomes permanent, and the title [in the
Confederacy’s private property] vests absolutely in the
conqueror.” 37
However, the modern rules of engagement and the U.S.
Military codes required that the U.S. government should not
destroy or permanently deprive the owners of their railways
and telegraphs within the South, but instead, the publicallyheld property should be restored to its original owners at the
conclusion of the war.38
Even though the case law provided that the government
had a right to keep any confiscated property, the U.S. Military
chose to vest its ownership interests in its previous Confederate
owners. Similarly in the North, the railroad companies were
fully reinvested in their possession and control of their
property, and the U.S. government compensated the companies
for the “transportation furnished by them.” 39
Although the analysis has been primarily about
railroads, President Lincoln also revolutionized wartime
communications by taking possession of the telegraph
companies. His taking of the telegraph companies created the
first military telegraph office in the country, and it was located
next door to Secretary of War Stanton’s office. These actions
soon led to the creation of the Military Telegraph Corps
Bureau.40
The telegraph companies performed similarly to the
railroad companies in that they made enormous wartime
profits. The telegraph companies made approximately
$2,655,000 (about 41 cents per message) from the government’s
communications during the Civil War.41 The government also
negotiated with the telegraph companies for special rates for
U.S. v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. 414, 434 (1872).
WILLIAM WINTHROP , MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 809 (1920).
39 Id. at fn. 39.
40 Id. at 44. The Military Telegraph Corps bureau will be later
expanded upon.
41 DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA: 1832-1920 (2012).
37
38
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messages sent and received, but other times, the government
paid the regular amount charged to any other party.
However, the telegraph companies gave the U.S.
military communications priority over all other telegraph
communications. This priority status could potentially cause an
unconstitutional “takings” situation. Furthermore, the
telegraph companies also received enormous wartime profits
from 1) the additional commercial traffic as well as from 2) the
large increase in the amount of telegraph coverage.42 This
increased commercial traffic included interpersonal
communications between soldiers and their families,
newspaper correspondence, and
other
war-related
communications. Neither the railroad nor telegraph industries
were harmed by the U.S. Military or the government’s actions.
No other violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is
present from Lincoln’s use of executive power in taking
possession of the railroad or telegraph companies.
Finally, the Congressional Act appointed the immediate
control of the new appropriations of the railroads and telegraph
companies to be placed under the direct supervision of the
Secretary of War.43 The Secretary of War at this point in history
was still included within the President’s cabinet. Therefore,
ultimate delegation and responsibility was on the President.
The Act finally concluded that it expressly preempted any other
regulations, rules, or laws that may be in conflict with the
“order.” 44

2. PRESIDENT LINCOLN ISSUES EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION.

Although the preceding section discussed the Act’s
components, subsequent legal consequences, Fifth Amendment
implications, and actual possession of the railroad and
telegraph companies, the analysis is constitutional if President
Lincoln issued appropriate executive orders in accordance with
the Congressional Act.

Id.
Act of Dec. 2, 1861, ch. 15§ 4, 1861 App. to the Congressional Globe
334, 335 (1861).
44 Id.
42
43
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On February 25, 1862, Secretary of War Stanton, by
order of the President, issued an executive order to take
“military possession of all the telegraph lines in the United
States.” 45 In the same executive order, the telegraph companies
were expressly prohibited from sending any unauthorized
information regarding military operations, and the
government’s possession and control of the telegraph lines was
not intended to “interfere in any respect with the ordinary
affairs of the companies or with private business.” 46 Later in the
year, on May 25, 1962, President Lincoln issued another
executive order allowing him to take “military possession of all
the railroads” until further orders, directing the companies and
officers to “hold themselves in readiness for the transportation
of such troops and munitions of war as may be ordered by the
military authorities, to the exclusion of all other business.” 47
The major difference between these two orders is that
within the latter order, President Lincoln’s intent was that the
government’s transportation needs outweigh the needs of any
private or commercial business the railroads performed. This
situation is in contrast to the former where the governmental
use of the telegraph companies’ property was not to interfere
with “business as usual.” Furthermore, the latter’s order was
executed by M.C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, on behalf of
Secretary of War Stanton, which in turn, was on behalf of
President Lincoln.48

C. HISTORICALLY , THE EXECUTIVE’S COMMANDER-INCHIEF POWER HAD TO BE BASED UPON A SPECIFIC PROVISION
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION OR EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY
CONGRESS.
Prior to the Civil War, the President’s use of executive
power was based upon a specific provision of the U.S.
Executive Order—Taking into Military Possession all Telegraph
Lines in the U.S., The American Presidency Project (Feb. 25, 1862),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69797.
46 Id.
47 Executive Order—Taking Military Possession of Railroads, The
American Presidency Project (May 25, 1862),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69807.
48 Id.
45
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Constitution or expressly authorized by Congress. President
Lincoln received expressed congressional authorization for
taking control of the railroad and telegraph companies during
the Civil War. This section analyzes different presidents’ use of
the Commander-in-Chief powers from George Washington up
to Abraham Lincoln’s presidency.
During George Washington’s presidency, the “most
prominent war powers questions of the time concerned
whether Congress had in fact approved specific” war actions.49
This quotation is an echo of the last section’s constitutional
analysis, following the dichotomy that if a president’s action is
not specifically enumerated within the U.S. Constitution, then
Congress must authorize the current president’s action. The
original congressional intent did not leave the President free of
any “statutory encumbrances in exercising his powers in
command in battle,” which suggests a strict, originalist view of
Congress’s authority to declare and ultimately supervise the
President.50 Although this view appears obsolete in the present
day, it appears to vest ultimate war power authority within the
two houses of Congress. In history, it seems most successful
armies have a centralized leader at the pinnacle of the
hierarchy, such as George Washington during the
Revolutionary War, to vest responsibility of the war’s ultimate
defeat or victory.51
While John Adams was the President, Congress
expressly authorized him to “raise an army of up to 10,000 men
to serve for three years” and later authorized him to “raise an
additional 12 infantry regiments and 6 troops of light
dragoons” in response to the looming French war.52 At that
time, Congress expressly determined the scope of the war by
determining the quantity of men and their time commitments
that would be allowed. In America’s young history, this
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb- A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 955
(2008).
50 Id.
51 Although this is a mere speculation in regards to historical figures
such as Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, and Emperor Napoleon
Bonaparte, the underlying theme is that history usually vests the
triumphs or defeats with one main actor regardless of the war
cabinet, armies, and other exigent circumstances.
52 Id. at 965.
49
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allocation of power was a marked increase by allowing the
President to have direct command over a standing army that
was only being raised in preparation, not actual current use, for
a war with France.
Following the French conflict, President Thomas
Jefferson recognized that the country should rely on the state
militia rather than having a standing army. In response,
Congress reduced half the regular army, down to about 3,300
standing troops.53 Around this time in 1807, the concept of the
executive branch’s “temporary necessity” doctrine arose, but
President Thomas Jefferson’s actions did not “appear to have
been a constitutional trump.” 54 Even during this era, there was
constant, almost fluid shifting of the executive’s scope of power
in relation to the legislature. However, many constitutional
scholars point this war out as being the only constitutional war
in history.
President Jefferson appropriated timber for gunboats
and chemicals for gunpowder. In doing so, he acknowledged
that he was acting outside his scope of power, but he believed
that Congress would ultimately approve his actions.55 Not only
did Congress ratify President Jefferson’s actions, it “stressed
that disregard of appropriations limitations would be”
permissible when Congress was not available to address a
national emergency.56 This is the same argument that President
Lincoln would later use when defending his actions in
appropriating funds and raising the Union Army.
During the War of 1812, a legal case arose where the U.S.
attorney general in Massachusetts filed to condemn over 500
tons of lumber within the U.S. that belonged to British
subjects.57 However, the United States Supreme Court held that
“the [governmental] seizure [requires] statutory authorization”
which Congress had not provided, rendering the action covered
within the legislature’s jurisdiction, rather than the President’s
Id. at 973.
Id. at 974.
55 Id. at 975 (quoting Informal Memorandum from President Thomas
Jefferson (July 18, 1807) (on file with Online Library of Liberty),
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jefferson -the-works-vol-1autobiography-anas-1760-1770.
56 Id.
57 Brown v. U.S., 12 U.S. 110, 121 (1814).
53
54
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authority under his Article II wartime powers.58 During the rest
of the era leading up to the Civil War, the sitting president, at
any given time, consistently accepted Congress’s war power
limitations.59 Just as the United States Supreme Court “carves
out” certain rights or doctrinal principles, the executive
branch’s remedy to the constant congressional restraint was to
creatively interpret the statutes to circumvent those limitations,
such as President Jefferson going through a dichotomy of using
the government’s “credit” to appropriate naval vessels and not
actually having approved unauthorized “expenditures.”
One of the major pre-Civil War issues between the
legislative and the executive branches was the disagreement
between President James Buchanan and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers’ Captain Meigs. This disagreement between the two
arose during the building of the Washington, D.C. aqueduct.60
After Secretary of War John Floyd fired Captain Meigs from the
aqueduct project over a disagreement, Meigs lobbied Congress
and received funding and direct supervision over the project.61
Understandably, President Buchanan found this situation to
usurp his presidential Commander in Chief powers because
such a relationship would cause Captain Meigs to fall outside
of the military hierarchy and no longer answerable to the
President. Attorney General Jeremiah Black affirmed President
Buchanan’s view that Congress could not allow Captain Meigs
to become independent of the President. However, the
statutory act allowing Meigs appropriations for and control
over the aqueduct project did not make him independent
because President Buchanan was still in a position to order him
as Commander in Chief.62
At this point prior to the Civil War, the executive
branch’s powers were fairly concrete with presidents carving
out exceptions when they were in times of “temporary
necessity.” The “temporary necessity” doctrine is a prelude to
the current day’s “ongoing emergency” doctrine. Even before
President Lincoln, Congress followed two major courses of
action. First, Congress expressly authorized the scope that the
Id.
Barron & Lederman, supra note 8, at 981.
60 Id. at 984.
61 Id.
62 Id.
58
59
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President was allowed to act within. The second course of
action was to allow the sitting President to appropriate troops
and property to meet a “temporary necessity” and later ratify
the President’s actions.

D. PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S USE OF EXECUTIVE POWERS
COMPELLED THE CREATION OF ENTIRE BUREAUS TO ASSIST
IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL, INFRASTRUCTURAL, AND
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL

WAR.

Thus far, the discussion has centered on the
constitutionality, procedure, and context of the President
exerting executive powers. This section addresses the
contemporaneous and subsequent effects of both Congress’s
and President Lincoln’s actions in regards to the taking of
personal property during the Civil War. This analysis is specific
to northern citizens only, and not a dichotomy of the
constitutionality or aspects of the Emancipation Proclamation.
President Lincoln’s aggressive use of executive war
powers compelled the creation of entire bureaus to assist in the
technological, infrastructural, and practical aspects of the Civil
War. Congress’s authorizations and President Lincoln’s
executive orders resulted in Secretary of War Edwin Stanton
creating two different bureaus to support mass transportation
of troops and mass communication: the U.S. Military Railroad
and the U.S. Military Telegraph Service. These bureaus assisted
in the technological, infrastructural, and practical aspects of the
Civil War, which ultimately allowed the Union to claim victory.
Both bureaus and their effects are addressed in turn.

1. THE PRESIDENT CREATES THE U.S. MILITARY RAILROAD
BUREAU

President Lincoln’s administration created the
U.S.M.R.R. for the purpose of transporting troops, munitions,
and other necessities of war.63 Even one of President Lincoln’s
most staunch critics, General George B. McClellan, admitted
that the introduction of “railroads has introduced a new and

Act of Dec. 2, 1861, ch. 15§ 1, 1861 App. to the Congressional Globe
334 (1861).
63

63

6 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2019)

very important element into the war.” 64 The U.S.M.R.R.’s
lasting effects would later become a precursor for President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s creating the U.S. Army’s
Transportation Corps.65 The same day that President Lincoln
issued his railroad executive order, Secretary of War Stanton
ordered D.C. McCallum’s appointment as military director and
superintendent of “the railroads in the U.S., with authority to
enter upon, take possession of, hold and use” all property in
relation to the President’s purpose of transportation. 66
After these preceding acts, the U.S.M.R.R. bureau
became existinct, and the government only had one railroad in
its possession for wartime use, which was a seven-mile-long
route from Washington, D.C. to Alexandria, Virginia.67
Brigadier General McCallum was already an experienced
railroad man who built railway and railway bridges during the
war. Regarding the Potomac Bridge, the only available supply
line between Fredericksburg and Richmond, 51,000 cars
traversed the bridge throughout the war.68 The U.S.M.R.R.
acted under the direct orders of both Secretary of War Stanton
as well as other superior U.S. Army officers.69
After his appointment to this newly-formed bureau in
1862, McCallum ordered the purchase of five locomotives and
eighty cars for military use. The major infrastructural and
practical problem McCallum faced was that all private
companies used different gauged tracks in order to compete in
their respective geographical markets.70 This meant that the
locomotives used on one railway could not be transferred onto
another company’s railway because the width and length of the
track were different between each company.
Over the entire course of the Civil War, McCallum
reported a total appropriations amount as follows: he spent $4.9
million in labor with a total net war expenditure of
CARL R. FISH, THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 778 (1937).
Executive Order 9082: Reorganizing the Army and the War
Department, The American Presidency Project (Feb. 28, 1942),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16227.
66 DANIEL C. MCCALLUM , R EPORT OF BREVET BRIG. GENERAL D.C.
MCCALLUM, 1, 3 (1866).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 4.
69 Id. at 41.
70 Id.
64
65
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$29,838,176.72 71 , he appropriated over 70 locomotives and 1,733
cars during the war, by purchase, capture, or being built72 , and
he built approximately 137,418 feet of the track, and he re-laid
about 185,440 feet.73
After the war’s end, the government reverted the
Southern owners’ property back via executive action on August
8, 1865.74 In regards to the immediate practical and logistical
impact on the Civil War, the U.S.M.R.R.’s first transportation of
troops was the transportation of 2,000 troops of the 6th
Massachusetts regiment, the 1st and 4th Pennsylvania
regiments, and the Washington Brigade of Philadelphia who
arrived in 35 cars into Baltimore. After arriving, they had to
walk a mile to switch railroads onto the B&O Railroad to
continue the trip to reinforce Washington.75 This expedition
carried with it the infamous Baltimore rioting attacks, in which
the troops were attacked while transitioning between rail lines.
This resulted in four soldiers’ and 12 civilians’ deaths, with 36
civilian injuries.76 Also, the U.S.M.R.R.’s largest reported
transportation was with the 4th Army Corps from Carter’s
Station, TN to Nashville, TN, totaling 33 miles with 1,498 cars.77
The most strategic use of the U.S.M.R.R. was Lincoln’s
authorization of a plan to reinforce General William Rosecrans
after being defeated in the battle of Chickamauga (Sept. of 1863)
and while there was a siege in Chattanooga, TN (as of Nov. of
1963).78
Because of Secretary Stanton’s and the U.S.M.R.R.’s
actions, the War Department transported Major General Joseph
Hooker and about 20,000 men and 3,000 horses and mules from
Virginia to eastern Tennessee, traveling 1,159 miles in seven to
nine days, preventing the Confederate Army from taking
Tennessee.79 This bureau’s achievements resulted in scientific
innovations, thereby assisting the Lincoln administration’s war
Id. at 10-47.
Id.
73 Id. (most tracks being about forty feet long multiplied by 4,636).
74 Id. at 47.
75 THOMAS WEBER, THE NORTHERN R AILROADS IN THE CIVIL WAR:
1861-1865 37-40 (1952).
76 Id. at 39.
77 McCallum, supra note 66, at 47.
78 DAVID H. DONALD , LINCOLN 457-58 (1995).
79 Id.
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prosecution. The use of the U.S.M.R.R. achieved a mass
transportation and supply chain that would transport many
troops and allowed them to be deployed in a distant location
where they were needed to supply existing troops, refresh more
troops, or remove wounded troops.80
Another contribution was the increased development in
efficient construction and destruction of both tracks and
bridges. These new construction techniques were completed
accurately and efficiently by using “ready-made bridges and
trestles constructed on an assembly-like technique.” 81 The final
and most interesting practical aspect of the U.S.M.R.R.’s war
contributions was its humanitarian impact.
The government developed special equipment,
including hospital cars that assisted in decreasing gangrene
rates among the wounded; hospital trains quickly evacuated
and treated the wounded; and armored cars with on-car
munitions or artillery readily assisted in the battlefield.82

2. THE PRESIDENT CREATES THE TELEGRAPH SERVICE
BUREAU.
After Secretary of War Stanton released the February 25,
1862 executive order that took military possession of all
telegraph lines, President Lincoln’s administration created the
U.S. Military Telegraph Service83.The executive order
authorized the “possession of, prevention of certain print or
letting news out, and it was not intended to interfere with
ordinary affairs of the companies or private businesses.”84
Before 1861, the Signal Corps was small and more
concentrated on large flag signals between ships on the sea or
regiments on the battlefield.85 Assistant Secretary of War
Thomas A. Scott became the general manager of all telegraph
Weber, supra note 75, at 264-67.
Id. at 267.
82 Id. at 268.
83 Hereafter “U.S.M.T.S.”
84 Executive Order—Taking into Military Possession all Telegraph
Lines in the U.S., The American
Presidency Project (Feb. 25, 1862),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69797.
85 JOSEPH W. BROWN, THE SIGNAL CORPS , U.S.A. IN THE WAR OF THE
REBELLION 140 (1896).
80
81
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lines so he could create the War Department’s telegraph office,
headed by Major Albert James Myer.86 The telegraph bureau
was created separate from the transportation corps and partly
separate from the Signal Corps because the government’s needs
required a completely different skill set and type of resources
than ever before.87 Telegraph workers were not considered
military personnel; however, unlike the railroad workers, they
were so skilled that they were “indispensable in their jobs” and
were not subject to the draft.88 Even though the U.S.M.T.S.
bureau was born and used in military operations, those men
who served in this bureau were not given military status. The
reason for which was to prevent them from being under
generals’ and other military officers’ control, rather than
immediately answerable to President Lincoln and Secretary of
War Stanton.89 Because of the bureau’s lack of skilled
“linesmen,” Congress finally passed a law that allowed military
men to join the Signal Corps and more specifically, the
U.S.M.T.S., while retaining their current military ranks and
pay.90
By 1863, the total amount of men in the U.S.M.T.S. was
1,012 strong, but by the end of the war, it increased to
approximately 2,500 men strong.91 At the beginning of the war,
approximately $10,000 was appropriated to the Signal Corps for
the construction expenditures of telegraph infrastructure.92
The U.S.M.T.S. worked with the U.S.M.R. by inventing
telegraph trains that were allowed to be near the occurring
battles, so generals could efficiently coordinate troop
movements and live battle reports could be sent to Washington,
D.C.93 The telegraph operations not only kept President
Lincoln supplied with a constant update on battle situations,
but this bureau assisted Union generals in concerting their
MAJOR GENERAL A.W. GREELY, THE MILITARY-TELEGRAPH SERVICE
PAR. 7 (1912),
86

http://www.civilwarsignals.org/pages/tele/telegreely/telegreely.h
tml.
87 Brown, supra note 85, at 123.
88 Id. at 155.
89 Greely, supra note 86, at par. 17.
90 Brown, supra note 85, at 145.
91 Id. at 160.
92 Id. at 171.
93 Id. at 172.
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attacks over long distance and in mass transit of soldiers.94 The
Confederate Army also attempted to wiretap the telegraph lines
but could not cipher the important encrypted messages to
Washington, D.C. In the same way, the Union would also
disseminate misleading military information to the
Confederate eavesdroppers of the U.S.M.T.S.95 This was
similar to the British during the Revolutionary War.
By the end of the Civil War, the U.S.M.T.S. had spent a
total appropriations allotment of about $16.9 million, including
total pay, clothing, transportation, forage, arms, and signal
apparatuses and stores.96 In total, the U.S.M.T.S. laid over
15,000 miles of telegraph line and had sent over 6.5 million
messages. While the telegraph companies gave the military use
priority in communications, the companies still made large
wartime profits.97 The creation of both the U.S.M.R.R. and
U.S.M.T.S. clearly had positive impacts on the war’s
technological, infrastructural, and practical aspects.

E. PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S EXPANSION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH HAD LEGAL IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE PRESIDENTS
AS WELL AS GOVERNMENTAL TAKINGS’ CASE LAW IN
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER .
As with any war, litigation arose in relation to Fifth
Amendment Takings. Also, the President’s use of executive
power broadened the scope of the executive branch’s position.
President Lincoln’s taking military possession of the rail and
telegraph companies’ property under the doctrine of temporary
necessity affected all three branches of government. This was
done by evolving governmental takings’ case law and
ultimately defining the scope of executive power. First, this
section addresses the subsequent effects on case law in regards
to the Civil War. Second, this section will address the
Greely, supra note 86, at par. 21.
Id. (The Union was also plagued by its own soldiers’ sabotage via
ignorance of the lines laid with railway, believing they were some
instrument of the enemy; they would often cut the lines open to view
what lie inside.).
96 Brown, supra note 85, at 122.
97 DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA: 1832-1920 6-31
(2012).
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chronology of effects on future presidents, including Theodore
Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Harry Truman in relation to
the same subject matter. Finally, this section will address Justice
Jackson’s concurrence from the Steel Seizure Case becoming the
U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion.
In U.S. v. Pacific Railroad, the Union Army destroyed
thirteen railroad bridges surrounding St. Louis, Missouri when
the Confederate Army, led by Sterling Price in October of 1864,
was closing in to capture the city.98 The U.S. government rebuilt
four of the 13 destroyed bridges after the incident for military
necessity; however, they charged the Pacific Railroad the total
amount of $181,548.89 for the rebuilding.99 The government
ultimately sued the company when it refused to pay. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the U.S. is not responsible for “the
destruction of private property by its military operation during
the [Civil War], nor are private parties chargeable for works
constructed on their property by the U.S. to facilitate such
operations [of war]” without the request of, or contract with the
railroad.100 This holding has two outcomes.
First, the government spent its resources rebuilding
private property; however, the government used rebuilt
property for its own necessity and use. Therefore, the owner
should not bear the financial burden. The Supreme Court’s
second holding is that private property destroyed during
wartime does not require the government to carry the liability
for compensating the owner. This is an important difference in
theory and thought in relation to the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings’ Clause.
Two ways of analyzing the Supreme Court’s rationale
exist. First, although the government took the private property
for its use without compensation, there was no property since
the bridge was destroyed. The government used its own
resources to rebuild and use the bridge. This situation would
result in the railroad company not having to pay for the new
bridge because it was not a party to any transaction until after
the military was finished using the newly-constructed bridge.
The second way of analyzing the constitutional implication is
that although the government destroyed the bridges so that
120 U.S. 227, 228 (1887).
Id. at 232.
100 Id. at 240.
98
99
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they would not fall into Confederate enemy hands, it did not
bear the loss of the property because the military was merely
destroying the enemy’s future property.101 However, the
owners were compensated in the way that the government
rebuilt the bridges for them, ultimately at no charge to the
owners because of the Supreme Court’s holding.
Along with this previous case, The Prize Cases assisted in
creating the doctrine of “enemy property.” 102 This doctrine
states that a private party cannot bring a takings claim if one’s
property is enemy property or will inevitably fall into enemy
hands, and if it is destroyed during wartime, the result is that
no one is liable for its loss because of the circumstances. 103 The
courts later stated that as to the justiciability of the “enemy
property doctrine,” federal courts have no role in supervising
presidential designations of such in regards to war powers.104
The Prize Cases are relevant, but not specifically to this
subject matter because they address executive power in the
context of the power to declare wars, order blockades, and seize
enemy property.105 Later and in World War Two, oil companies
with property in Manila brought suit against the U.S.
government for destroying terminal facilities while engaging
the Empire of Japan.106 The Supreme Court held that destroying
property for the purpose of preventing strategically-valued
property from falling into enemy hands was considered
“waging war” and did not violate the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.107
The Supreme Court did not expressly restate the
existence of the “enemy property” doctrine, but it did state that
the U.S. makes no promise to compensate “all who suffer from
every ravage and burden of war,… and in wartime[,] many
losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war and not
See Vladeck, infra note 102.
Stephen I. Vladeck, Re-Rethinking the Prize Cases: Some Remarks in
Response to Professor Lee, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 85, 59 (2008).
103 Id.
104 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. U.S., 378 F.3d 1346, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (addressing President Bill Clinton’s use of executive power to
destroy a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in 1998).
105 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). It does not specifically address
property rights of lawful citizens.
106 U.S. v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952).
107 Id.
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to the sovereign, and no rigid rules will be laid down to
distinguish compensable losses from non-compensable losses,
but each case will be judged on its own facts.” 108 Therefore, on
a case-by-case analysis, the court should decide which
government is at fault and apply the enemy property doctrine.
This is still good law.
In regards to the Executive Branch, the old adage that
“power corrupts” is accurate. In any Introduction to
Constitutional Law course, the professor will almost always
orate Lord Acton’s quote that “power corrupts and absolute
power corrupts absolutely” in regards to the executive branch.
Although President Lincoln has been accused of serious
constitutional violations, he is not the only president who has
attempted to unilaterally assert unconstitutional powers. For
instance, during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, he wielded
unauthorized executive power on the basis of “public policy”
by building the Panama Canal.109
President Theodore Roosevelt often claimed rights to
action via his Commander in Chief powers. These powers were
becoming more recognized and accepted by legal scholars as
there was now an omnipresent army and navy.110 The “Great
White Fleet” naval tour occurred during his presidency, and he
later released a controversial executive order restricting the
Marine Corps to on-shore bases only, causing intense friction
between the Legislative and Executive Branches.111 President
Roosevelt finally acquiesced to Congress’s limitation, thwarting
a “battle of the branches” scenario. Later, President Woodrow
Wilson unilaterally set a fixed price for procuring the navy’s
coal throughout the Navy Department from private parties, and
the Supreme Court found that the “owner of coal taken by the
government under [the Lever Act], was entitled to the full
money equivalent of the property taken, and to be put in as

Id.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 647 (1913).
110 David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb- A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1035
(2008).
111 Id.
108
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good position pecuniarily as it would have occupied, had its
property had not been taken.” 112
A few decades later, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer proved to be one of the most influential and still current
examples of the Executive’s power in regards to governmental
Takings Clause.113 Although the facts have been scattered
across many other cases and law reviews, they will be briefly
described here. President Truman directed the seizure and
operation of the nation’s steel mills in response to labor union
disputes under the rationale that his actions were necessary to
“avert a national catastrophe” in the Korean War.114 The
Supreme Court found that the President’s preventing labor
disputes was under Congress’s jurisdiction and not within the
President’s jurisdiction. The President could not use military
authorities through executive action to “expand the theater of
war” powers as Commander-in-Chief, seizing the steel plants
by military force.115 The President’s use of military force could
not be “sustained as [an] exercise of [the] President’s military
power” and was unconstitutional. 116
The outcome may have been very different had the
Korean War been ongoing instead of concluded. However,
more interesting and resounding was Justice Jackson’s
classification concurrence that describes the President’s powers
as not being “fixed but [fluctuating], depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.” 117 In his
concurrence, Justice Jackson proposed an “over-simplified
grouping” of the tests to determine the strength of the
President’s powers. Within the first classification, the President
“acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress,” and his power is at its height because he “possesses
in his own right plus all that Congress [has delegated].” 118
Justice Jackson further added that a “seizure [of property]
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress
U.S. v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923) (quoting
Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. U.S., 261 U.S. 299 (1923)).
113 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
114 Id. at 582.
115 Id. at 587.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 635.
118 Id.
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would be supported by the strongest presumptions and widest
latitude of judicial interpretation,” causing almost limitless
executive power.119 This first classification is commonly
referred to as the President’s “high-watermark of power.”
This is also the classification to which President
Lincoln’s taking possession of the railroad and telegraph
companies’ property lies. Within the second classification,
Congress has remained neutral in neither granting nor denying
the President authority, but in this classification, the President
may “rely upon his own independent powers” during this
“twilight” of power where either he or Congress may possess
the power to act, but he nonetheless acts first and his actions
may be later condemned or allowed by Congress.120 As
previously discussed, President Thomas Jefferson’s actions
with procuring boats for war would fall into this category.121
The third and final classification is the lowest ebb of the
executive power for the President. When he wields his power
in a way that is “incompatible with the [express] or implied will
of Congress,” he can only act upon matters that remain after
Congress has acted.122 In theory, this explanation of power
would best be illustrated by the seminal case of Marbury v.
Madison where the Supreme Court states that the Court may
exercise judicial review over the executive branch.123
Justice Jackson’s concurrence later became the Supreme
Court’s majority opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981).124 In 1979, the Iranian hostage crisis began and
President Jimmy Carter acted pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and seized all
Iranian assets.125 After an agreement ending all litigation
between Iran and the U.S., the plaintiff challenged the
Executive Branch’s powers in making the agreement, claiming
the agreement was unconstitutional.126 The Supreme Court’s
Id. at 637.
Id. In theory, this approach is similar to the “first in time”
domestic relations doctrine where whoever files a parenting plan
first “wins,” but the plan may granted or denied by the court.
121 Barron & Lederman, supra note 110.
122 Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 637-40.
123 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162 (1803).
124 DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’ S CONSTITUTION 131 (2003).
125 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981).
126 Id. at 655.
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majority opinion entered into Justice Jackson’s previous
concurrence.127 The Court restated the three classifications of
Executive’s power, even though the taxonomy would never be
completely “black and white.” 128 The Court found that
President Carter’s actions fell within the first classification and
they were “taken pursuant to specific congressional
authorization [and were] supported by the strongest
presumptions and widest latitude of judicial determination.”
President Carter acted just as President Lincoln did, through
Congress’s express authorization.

F. THE CURRENT STATE OF TEMPORARY NECESSITY HAS
TRANSFORMED INTO “NATIONAL EMERGENCY.”
As a final point, relevant but not separate from the
article’s dialogue, is the modern executive branch’s use of
declaring a “national emergency” to justify its actions that may
violate the U.S. Constitution. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
presidency, there has been almost a constant state of “national
emergency” that has been renewed by other presidents,
including President Truman in 1950, President Nixon in 1970,
and even Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.129
This “national emergency” is an echo of previous presidents’
“temporary necessity” argument. However, Congress has
allowed the current day’s “national emergency” expansion of
power by codifying it in the U.S. Code through the National
Emergency Act and International Emergency Economic Powers
Act.130 These executive proclamations give force to about 470
different provisions of Federal law.131
Some of these powers include seizing property,
organizing and controlling the means of production, seizing
commodities, assigning military forces abroad, instituting
martial law, seizing and controlling all transportation and
Id. at 668.
Id.
129 MICHAEL BADNARIK, GOOD TO BE KING: THE FOUNDATION OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM 72-3 (2004).
130 Jason Luong, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181
(2000).
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communication, regulating the operation of private enterprise,
restricting travel, and ultimately controlling the particularity of
American citizens’ lives.132 Even in the 1970s, members of
Congress recognized the executive branch’s encroachment
upon the U.S. Constitution. Congressman Beck noted that the
President’s range of powers did and still allows him or
Congress to proclaim a national emergency.133
This state of constitutional affairs is the same as with
President Lincoln. He was able to seize property, suspend
habeas corpus, and control the press; however, in regards to the
railroads and telegraph companies, his military possession was
both necessary and constitutional. The continued tolerance of
allowing the executive branch to usurp its constitutional
bounds is the result of congressional inaction and judicial
tolerance that must be remedied.134 In Lincoln’s national
emergency of Civil War and even now during the ongoing war
on terror, “adherence to constitutional principles is even more
warranted during such times ‘so that we may resist the
temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient
solution to the crisis of the day.’”135

CONCLUSION
President Lincoln was a man faced with a presidency of
epic proportions. His country was on the brink of Civil War,
and he was required to act quickly in hopes of the Union’s
preservation. Congress expressly and constitutionally
authorized his taking military possession of the railroad and
telegraph companies’ property. President Lincoln acted within
the historical contextual scope of his powers in regards to this
situation. His use of his authorized executive powers created
the U.S.M.R.R., a precursor to the U.S. Army’s Transportation
Corps and the U.S.M.T.S., a division of the Signal Corps. He
utilized these bureaus both assisted in bringing an end to the
U.S. Civil War as well as progressing war’s use of mass
transportation and communication. Ultimately, his actions, as
Id. at 73.
S. REP. NO. 93-549 (1973).
134 Luong, supra note 130, at 1200.
135 Id. at 1213 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187
(1992)).
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well as the results of the Civil War, impacted case law and
future presidents’ use of the executive power to the point that
now, perhaps the time has come for the legislative and judicial
branches to reign in the executive branch’s powers to bring the
balance and separation of powers back into the constitutional
realm.
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